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CAPsMAN

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An access point provisioned by CAPsMAN holds none of its own wireless configuration — the controller owns it. Reading the AP directly returns blank SSID, security and band, which makes a perfectly healthy access point look broken.

The platform models the controller relationship instead.

Device roles

Every device is classified each poll from /interface/wifi/capsman and /interface/wifi/cap:

Role Meaning
standalone Has radios, manages them itself
cap Radios are provisioned by a controller
controller Runs CAPsMAN; has no radios of its own
controller_cap Runs CAPsMAN and its own radios under it — a supported MikroTik arrangement
none No wireless hardware

The role is detected, not inferred from device_type. That matters because a dedicated controller is usually classified as a router, and device_type is a label a human typed rather than a fact about the hardware. The Radios tab and the wireless section follow the detected role.

How CAPs are matched to devices

The controller enumerates every radio it manages — local and remote — through /interface/wifi/radio, each with a radio-mac. Those MACs are matched against every interface MAC in the fleet.

MAC rather than IP address, deliberately: a MAC is hardware identity and unique fleet-wide, whereas an address is only unique within a broadcast domain. An installation with several segments reusing the same addressing would otherwise attribute a radio to the wrong device entirely.

Two refinements come from real deployments:

  • A controller mirrors each CAP's interfaces locally, so a CAP's radio MAC genuinely appears on two devices. A radio the controller reports as local: false lives on a CAP by definition, so the controller is never a valid answer for it.
  • A radio MAC often differs from the device's interface MAC in the final octet, so lookup falls back to a five-octet prefix while keeping the OUI exact.

A CAP that is not in the fleet is surfaced as unmanaged rather than hidden — that is usually the reason an access point appears to be missing.

What you get

The CAPsMAN panel on the Wireless page lists every controller with the access points it provisions, one row per radio: the AP it lives on (linked), interface name, provisioned SSID, operating channel, connected clients, and state.

Two details are read from the controller rather than the CAP, because the CAP does not know them:

  • SSID — held on the controller's mirror of the interface.
  • Client counts — a CAP's own registration table is empty when traffic is processed centrally. Counts come from the registration table with each client attributed to its radio by following master-interface, since clients register on the virtual AP carrying the SSID rather than on the physical radio.

Write protection

A provisioned radio is owned by the controller, so a local write to it is either rejected outright or silently replaced at the next provision — while the API reports success.

Five paths refuse or skip provisioned radios, naming the controller in the error: bulk SSID deployment, interface create, interface edit, interface delete, and guest network setup.

Current limits

Provisioning, configuration edits and interface enable/disable are deliberately not exposed. A CAPsMAN configuration applies to every access point bound to it simultaneously — the fleet-wide version of the failure Change Guard exists to prevent. Those operations are held back until they carry the same prediction-and-revert protection that per-device changes do.

Legacy /caps-man — the pre-RouterOS 7 controller — is a separate API tree and is not covered. The RouterOS 7 wifi stack is supported.

Roaming history

A client's association history is reconstructed from access point logs at GET /api/clients/:mac/roaming?range=24h, and shown on the client detail page.

Roaming happens between polls, so a poll-based view can never see it — the log is the only record that a client moved, when, and at what signal. Sessions are rebuilt from RouterOS's own lines, including every band or AP change and the disconnect reason.

Sessions with six or more roams per hour are flagged. A client bouncing between radios usually indicates roaming thresholds rather than a faulty client: overlapping cells at similar signal give it no reason to prefer one.

Nothing new is collected — this reads the events already gathered, so it works retroactively over whatever log history exists. It does require association logging to be enabled on the access points.